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This paper is a first step towards the analysis of the joint decision-making mode of 
governance in the EU. It argues that such a mode of governance enhances policy 
effectiveness in the field of environmental policy. This is mainly due to the as yet 
neglected  phenomenon  of  the  interaction  between  representative  institutions  at 
different levels in the European Union that characterises joint decision-making. The 
European  Parliament,  as  a  co-legislator  with  veto  power  in  the  co-decision 
procedure, has been a crucial organisational actor. Its interactions with other actors 
such  as  national  parliaments  and  the  Council  of  Ministers  and  the  European 
Commission  are  particular  relevant  in  the  building-up  of  more  appropriate  and 
legitimate  incentives  for  the  correct  implementation  of  common  policies, 
internalising many externalities. It has also allowed for a more active role of EU 
national parliaments in the EU legislative process, increasing their leverage vis-à-vis 
their respective governments as far as European legislation is concerned. 
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While one could argue at first sight that, with EMU achieved
2, there was no other 
clear and powerful challenge left that could trigger a sustained change in political 
attitudes and policy stances (increasing the effectiveness and democratic quality of 
governance  in  the  EU),  new  challenges  have  surfaced  that,  by  being  raised  to 
political objectives, may fulfil that function. 
New environmental constraints
3 are perceived in the civil society at large, 
much  more  than  in  the  case  of  EMU,  as  a  set  of  pre-conditions  for  sustained 
development  and  quality  of  life.  Therefore,  the  political  consensus (and popular 
support within the civil society in general and among NGOs in particular) is much 
stronger  with  respect  to  internalising  at  the  European  level  environmental 
externalities  (pollution)  than  with  respect  to  internalising  at  the  European  level 
monetary externalities (exchange rate instability).
4 
However, contrary to what happened in the case of EMU, they seem to be 
quite far from being transposed into clear goals involving a well-defined common 
strategy with an objective and calendar, like the one provided by the fulfilment of 
the Maastricht criteria as a pre-condition for EMU accession. 
  By themselves, however, such constraints may nevertheless constitute a set 
of principles for the conduct of national policies that is increasingly becoming the 
subject of both inter-governmental and (European) public opinion discussions about 
the future of Europe and the reform of its policies.
5 This paper discusses how EU 
joint decision-making may help transform such constraints into common objectives, 
enhancing policy effectiveness in the field of environmental policy. 
                                           
2 For a parallel analysis of a supranational regulation mode of governance, namely Economic and 
Monetary Union, see Torres (2003). 
3 The Amsterdam Treaty has laid down in two articles of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community (TEC) that environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition 
and implementation of EU policies with a view to promoting sustainable development (Article 6) and 
that environment policy at the Community level shall aim at a high level of protection taking into 
account  the  diversity  of  situations  with references to the precautionary principle and preventive 
action and the polluter-pays principle (Article 174 (2)). 
4 According to recent polls (Eurobarometer 56, Fig. 4.3), for 87 per cent of the European Union’s 
population protecting the environment as well as food quality (very much linked to the broad category 
of environmental and quality of life issues that are used as an example in the paper) should be a 
priority for EU action. As far as EMU is concerned, even immediately before the launching of euro 
bills and coins (November 2001), the successful implementation of the single European currency was 
only a priority for EU action for 67 per cent of EU citizens. On the other hand, only 9 per cent thought 
the environment should not be a priority for the EU as compared to 26 per cent in the case of EMU. 
5 These preoccupations are clearly present in opinion polls (for instance on food quality and the 
environment), national policy changes (the creation in Italy – under the previous government -, in 
Germany  and  in  Britain  of ministries of food quality and consumer protection instead of the 
traditional  production-oriented  ministries  of  agriculture)  and  several  political  speeches  on  the 
need for European policies’ (CAP’s) reform. Of course, the European Convention was the most 
significant forum in that regard.  
 
2 
 The subsequent section discusses the process of internalising environmental 
externalities at the EU level. The paper goes on addressing the issue of how the 
stage of economic development and some features of cohesion policy may hinder 
the capacity to reach new enduring consensual reforms in the EU (section 3) and 
how the building-up of bottom-up pressures may have a counteracting effect (section 
4). Section 5 deals with the question of the qualitative change in the process of 
continuously evolving governance in the EU. Section 6 discusses the role of the EP 
in bridging the gap between national and European representation and section 7 
looks  at  the  co-decision  procedure  and  the  interaction  between  different 




  The Single European Act (SEA), the Treaty of Maastricht and the Treaty of 
Amsterdam introduced environmental policy into the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU) and the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC). They did so 
more in terms of operating principles than in terms of objectives (see Nugent, 1999). 
In fact, Article 175 of the TEC is particularly relevant for specifying three legislative 
methods: the cooperation procedures; unanimity in the European Council; and the 
co-decision procedure for general action programmes. Most legal instruments take 
the form of European directives. There are also other types of instruments such as 
information campaigns and the European Environment Agency established in 1994. 
Many of these instruments are also designed to give effect to Environmental Action 
Programmes (EAP), adopted since 1973.  
  In this context, the currently developing institutions (in the broad sense of 
the  term
6)  in  the  EU  -  such  as  EMU  (which  will  potentially  increase  policy 
transparency in the Euroland) and the new European co-decision procedure -, do 
play a role in shaping new common rules that are accepted by a majority of member 
states  and,  more  importantly,  by  a  majority  of  the  European  population. 
Furthermore,  although  through  a  multitude  of  different  channels  such  as  the 
European Convention, the IGCs, treaty changes and referenda or the European co-
decision  process,  new  common  rules  are  increasingly  the  subject  of  multi-level 
political negotiation, allowing for increased participation of many different actors.  
  With a view to improving the rather unsatisfactory implementation record of 
environmental  policies,  the  5
th  Environmental  Action  Programme  (1993-2000), 
“Towards Sustainability”, has also increased the emphasis on shared responsibilities 
at different levels of government. This emphasis raises precisely the importance of 
the interaction between institutions, namely between representative institutions, and 
of enlarged participation and increased transparency in these multi-level forms of 
governance. 
  With the forthcoming enlargement of the EU and the prospect of a closer 
political union for a limited number of countries within the Union (reinforced co-
                                           
6 The rules of the game. See North (1990).  
 
3 
operations), it might again be politically decisive for some member countries with 
less popular support for EU action on the environmental side to be always in the 
core  of  European  integration  and  not  to  be  perceived  as  laggards  by  their 
counterparts and by their constituencies. 
  In this respect, some new EU instruments might exert an important influence 
and  even  (democratic)  conditionality  (through  the  availability  of  structural  and 
cohesion  funds,  especially  for  old  and  new  cohesion  countries)  on  the  need  for 
reform and on national policies. Those new instruments comprise the Nature 2000 
network,  the  Environmental  Action  Programmes  and  many  ensuing  European 
directives that fall under the co-decision procedure, new agencies (as, for instance, 
food quality), and the new strategy for sustainable development (SSD), adopted in 
June  2001 by the European Council in Gothenburg (see European Commission, 
2001). The latter added the environmental dimension to the Lisbon strategy and to 
the  Broad  Economic  Policy  Guidelines  (BEPG)
7,  which  are  at  the  centre  of 
economic policy co-ordination. 
  What is new about the environmental dimension is the fact that, because of 
the pace of both the globalisation and the European integration processes, global 
challenges such as the need to act upon the deterioration of the environment, which 
command much more popular support than the need to internalise other types of 
externalities, transform into EU policy constraints. This transformation takes place 
through a continuous political negotiation process carried out at multiple levels of 
government, in which the European Parliament might reflect the views of citizens, 
national  parliaments  and  NGOs.  Through  such  a  process,  in  turn,  EU  policy 
constraints may also be raised to national political objectives (as happened directly, 
without any intermediate step, in the case of EMU) in spite of a sceptical attitude on 




   
In  the  case  of  environmental  policies,  the  situation  is  somehow  more 
complex than in the case of EMU, as it is much more difficult to monitor their 
implementation. As in the case of EMU, there are some EU member countries, such 
as Italy, where there seemed to be until recently (at least in the North) a stronger 
consensus about the need for higher environmental standards than in countries such 
as  Portugal  and  Spain  where  that  consensus  may  still  be  weaker.  In  fact, 
environmental  awareness  tends  to  be  lower  in  less  developed  economies  (see 
                                           
7 These Guidelines are now also discussed before approval at a new level: joint meetings between 
national MPs and MEPs. The first of these meetings took place in Brussels on 23 February 1999. 
The Lisbon Summit of March 2000, stressing the need for a regular political discussion of the Broad 
Economic Policy Guidelines at the Council Spring Meetings, reinforced that cooperation. 
8 This process might be somehow symmetrical for “Southern” and “Northern” Member States as far 
as EMU and the environment are concerned. It takes place through different channels though in 
“Southern” and “Northern” Member States, namely the co-decision procedure in the case of the 
former and the smooth functioning of the single currency in the case of the latter.  
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Pridham  and  Cini,  1994).  Nevertheless,  Italy’s  performance  both  in  terms  of 
transposing EU directives and in the light of infringements and convictions before 
the European Court of Justice was not better than Portugal’s and Spain’s.
9 
Drawing on the experience of EMU, Italy and Spain likewise experienced a 
much stronger consensus on the need to meet the convergence criteria than Portugal 
that, given the flexibility of its economy but also its less developed social welfare 
system,  was  able  to  meet  the  Maastricht  criteria  with  less  effort.  Portugal 
experienced a much stronger internal criticism during the period of convergence and 
it is coping at present with much greater difficulties to comply with the stability 
pact, mainly due to structural (systemic) weaknesses in both its health sector and the 
Public Administration. 
In  the  case  of  environmental  policies,  the  problem  is  that  transposing 
European directives does not automatically mean enforcement, as clearly illustrated 
by many examples. In the case of Southern EU countries for instance there are still 
many serious problems that can certainly be ascribed to systemic deficiencies of 
political  and  administrative  institutions.  In  Italy  and  Spain  there  is  also  vertical 
fragmentation  (between  state  and  regional  governments)  although  horizontal 
fragmentation (among different ministries at the central level) has been reduced in 
most  countries  by  strengthening  the  respective  environmental  ministries  with 
significantly more competencies than before. 
Like in the case of EMU, the level of economic development seems to affect 
some EU Members’ attitudes towards environmental policies at least as far as some 
Southern EU members are concerned. It translates into the following reasoning: we 
should first grow to levels closer to our Northern partners before we can afford to 
have  higher  (monetary  or  environmental)  standards  that  might  hamper  “real” 
convergence. 
Recall that, in the mid 1990’s, the EMU debate centred on the issue of real 
versus  nominal  convergence.  It  was  claimed  that  monetary  integration  (nominal 
convergence) with more advanced economies (Germany) would significantly slow 
down the catching-up process (real convergence).
10 Since 1998 only few politicians, 
policy-makers  and  commentators  have  not  come  to  recognise  the  advantages  of 
EMU  for  sustained  growth.  Yet,  many  still  argue  that  higher  environmental 
standards  (quality  convergence),  although  a  desirable  aim  in  the  long  run,  may 
hamper faster economic growth and hence real convergence.  
Along similar lines, it is still often argued by politicians and policy-makers 
in  the  catching-up  countries  that  European  environmental  policies,  like  solid 
monetary institutions and sound fiscal practices, cannot be reconciled and are in 
                                           
9 See Börzel (2000) for data on EU members’ performance in transposing EU directives and on 
infringements and convictions before the European Court of Justice. See also the annual reports of 
the ECJ and the annual reports of the European Commission on Monitoring the Application of 
Community Law. On the basis of actions taken due to the failure to fulfil obligations and judgements 
with which the state has not yet complied, countries where one would expect a stronger consensus 
about the need for higher environmental standards also perform rather badly. 
10 See Jones et al. (1998) for a discussion.  
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conflict with, notably, the need to preserve and create employment (take for instance 
Pridham and Cini, 1994) and the need to foster economic growth. 
Furthermore, according to Michael Carley and Ian Christie (2000, p. 123), 
there  is  a  complex  tension  between  centralization  and  decentralization  over 
environmental policies. In fact, some EU member states are concerned that decision-
making  on  environmental  policy  and  impact  assessment  is  over-centralised  in 
Brussels  while  for  other  EU  member  states  and/or  many  EU  citizens  and  non-
governmental  organisations  that  very  centralisation  has  not  come  a  moment  too 
soon, since environmental protection receives no more than lip service from national 
governments.
11 That apparent over-centralisation, it is argued below, may also reflect 
both democratic influences (namely decisions from the European Parliament) and 




That  sceptical  reasoning  that  higher  environmental  standards  and/or 
increased EU action on environmental matters may impede the catching-up process 
with the most developed EU countries has received further support in the cohesion 
countries  because  of  the  felt  need  to  take  the  most  (and  fast)  advantage  of  the 
existence  of  Community  Framework  Support  (CFS)  programmes  (basically 
structural  and  cohesion  funds).  By  limiting  national  public  deficits  (and  thus 
expenditures), the Stability and Growth Pact in fact limits the amount of community 
funds that can be used nationally due to the principle of additionality of EU and 
national  resources.  For  the  same  reason,  higher  environmental  standards,  in 
conjunction  with  mandatory  in-depth  environmental  impact  assessment  (EIA), 
would reduce the number of projects approved for EU co-financing. 
That logic has been quite pervasive in many of the policy positions assumed 
by Greece, Portugal, Spain and sometimes Italy with respect to the approval of some 
important directives. In addition, the perceived negative impact of the adoption of 
higher  environmental  standards  on  short-run  competitiveness  -  a  short-term 
consideration  as  opposed  to  restructuring  and  innovation  in  the  wake  of  more 
demanding environmental standards that constitute a GHIDFWR industrial policy - may 
also be responsible for that reasoning. 
Let me take two examples with different fates. The auto-oil programme - a 
series of EU directives (Directives 70/220/EC and 93/12/EC)under co-decision in the 
EU to reduce some forms of gas emissions and increase fuel quality standards – was 
a relative success. That was probably due to the fact that it fell under the co-decision 
procedure. In spite of vested interests (oil companies), that more than just lobbying 
before and during the co-decision procedure almost appeared to negotiate instead of 
some governments, the European Parliament managed to overcome those interests 
and the resistances of some national governments.  
                                           
11  Carley  and  Christie  (2000)  take  up  that  issue  on  a  global  scale  on  questions  such  as  ozone 
depletion and global warming.  
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Due  to  rising  public  concern  about  global  warming,  the  European 
Commission had already proposed in 1990 a combined tax on energy and CO2 
emissions to be levied by national governments. In the light of the strong opposition 
of industry and the lack of enthusiasm of finance ministers, supposedly also because 
of the technical difficulties it entailed, the proposal was never adopted, not even in 
its soft form (Commission amendment of 1995) that made its adoption voluntary. 
One of the political issues at stake was the exemption of catching-up countries.
12 
The  initial  fierce  opposition  from  the  governments  of  the  UK  and  of  the  four 
cohesion countries, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, finished the proposal off. 
More recently, in 1999, Spain and Ireland rejected in the Ecofin a compromise put 
forward  by  the  German  presidency  of  the  European  Council  that  would  have 
allowed Spain to set low rates or grant exemptions. 
These two examples seem relevant because, again like in the case of EMU, 
the policies proposed involved reforms and change in attitudes concerning issues 
very much present in the daily life (and discussions) of many European citizens.
13 
The argument is that the relative level of economic development of a country is 
important  to  push  policies  through.  In  some  ways  and  through  the  mechanisms 
described in this section, the level of economic development affects the capacity of a 
(national) political system and in the end of a polity (or a polity in the making) such 
as the European Union to internalise some externalities. 
Nevertheless, considerations referring to the level of economic development 
and wrong incentives of EU cohesion programmes as well as false perceptions on 
prosperity convergence with the rest of Europe have, unlike in the case of EMU, 




In some EU countries, namely in the so-called cohesion countries, although 
the change in attitudes and practices in the political and administrative systems may 
still be rather weak, there are visible signs of greater environmental awareness and 
better  strategic  planning  behind  public  decisions,  namely  regarding  the  national 
approach to the latest Community Framework Support programme (Agenda 2000). 
This  in  turn  has  contributed  to  an  increased  effectiveness  (outcomes)  of 
environmental policies. 
Moreover,  this  change  in  attitudes  and  practices  in  the  political  and 
administrative systems, although still feeble, is also slowly starting to respond to the 
democratic deficit in environmental management procedures and increasingly facing 
important bottom-up pressures.
14 Such a process also improves transparency and 
                                           
12 Again, the stage of economic development argument was put forward. 
13 Both at the European level and at the heart of national politics. Take the case of the ÖNRVWHXHU in 
Germany. 
14 Namely complaints from NGOs, groups of citizens and even national parliamentarians to the 
European Commission.   
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participation. It is noteworthy that one of the rare cases of infringement proceedings 
before  the  European  Court  of  Justice  happens  to  be  the  conflict  between  the 




According to Tanja Börzel’s Pull and Push model, environmental policies 
stand  a  good  chance  of  being  effectively  implemented  when  the  authorities  are 
“sandwiched” between domestic non-governmental actors, NGOs and, one could 
add,  national  parliaments,  and  the  EU.
15  The  perception  of  this  pressure  from 
“below” and “above” may also prompt the authorities and as well politicians in 
general to shift from a reactive to a proactive stance. The aforementioned political 
change reflects the pressure from “below” and from “above”. 
Note that, as in the case of bottom-up pressures, pressures from below push 
for more democratic participation. Unlike top-down pressures, however, pressures 
from above, in the case of the shaping of environmental policies in the EU, allow for 
the influences of representative (parliamentarian) institutions. These influences – 
basically  the  decisions  of  the  European  Parliament,  in  some  cases  taken  in 
conjunction  with  national  parliaments  or at least with some national MPs – are 
increasingly powerful and obviously push for more democracy. 
In any case, such a move towards a proactive attitude has a more direct 
impact  on  policy  formulation  than  on  policy  implementation.  This  is  quite 
significant,  firstly,  in  terms  of  democratic  decision-making  and,  secondly,  for 
traditional  “laggards”  that  do  not  have  clearly  structured  environmental  policy 




  The pull and push model can be much more effective in practice if there are 
some mechanisms of conditionality (namely of financial resources) involved in the 
processes  of  building-up  both  pressures  from  above  and  pressures  from  below 
(bottom-up conditionality). The need for fiscal consolidation has already led to a 
more careful - not necessarily better in environmental terms - planning of the use of 
structural and cohesion funds. Moreover, conditionality has always been a feature of 
the Cohesion Fund, with the need to respect the convergence plan (before EMU) and 
the Stability and Growth Pact (since the beginning of EMU’s third phase). 
  Recently, eco-conditionality started to play a role, too. In March 2000, the 
European Commission threatened to withhold regional aid from countries that did 
not  respect  (read  implement)  the  Nature  2000,  a  European  ecological  network, 
selecting and appointing Special Protection Areas (SPAs, under the Birds Directive 
79/409/EC)and Special Areas of Conservation (SACs, under the Habitats Directive 
92/43/EC). That move was backed by the European Parliament and has generated 
                                           
15 See Börzel (2000).  
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pressure from “below”, including national parliaments and some political parties or 
some (“greener”) factions of those parties. 
  Although the Commission had only stated that it would hold back funds 
from  countries  that  failed  to  provide  satisfactory  information  on  how they were 
implementing that specific legislation, softening its stance by adding even that the 
principle of proportionality would be respected
16, the principle of eco-conditionality 
was brought up and entered European and national discussions. Note, however, that 
in this case the principle of conditionality was not set to work automatically as in the 
case of the cohesion fund and the convergence and stability and growth programmes 
and  that,  of  course,  the  subsidiarity  principle  may  also  contribute  to  avoid  any 
automatism, preventing conditionality to work at all in practice.
17 
  In fact, that link between conditionality and subsidiarity and indeed both 
concepts have not been used coherently (let alone rigorously) in the political arena. 
And yet they are always present in political discussions about European common 
policies involving financial resources. 
It would be important to further develop the link between conditionality, 
subsidiarity and accountability in order to allow for the development of some forms 
of bottom-up conditionality. It is clear, however, that, once more, the interaction of 
representative (parliamentarian) institutions is already playing an important role in 
establishing the basis for some form of bottom-up conditionality, while respecting 
the principle of subsidiarity and enhancing the democratic accountability of different 
agencies in charge of specific programmes. 
These developments would have been impossible at the inter-governmental 
level alone. The interaction of different representative (parliamentarian) institutions 
at different levels of the permanent process of political negotiation in the EU, both 
among  themselves  and  with  other  institutions  (the  European  Council,  the  EU 
Council of Ministers, the European Commission, etc.) and actors in the civil society, 
is allowing for the building-up of more appropriate (and legitimate) incentives for 
the correct implementation of common policies.
 18 
                                           
16 This principle provides wrong incentives: countries may shy away from any ambitions in terms of 
nature  protection.  This  was  already  the  case  of  conditionality  of  the  Cohesion  fund  on  the 
convergence programmes (where there was an incentive not to be too ambitious in terms of fiscal 
consolidation) but it is not any more the case with the Stability and Growth Pact. 
17 Already at the 1985 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), the Single European Act while giving 
the EU (at that time EC) a wide scope for environmental action (Article 130r.1) invoked for the first 
time in the EC Treaty (Article 130r.4) the principle of subsidiarity. It was cancelled when the general 
subsidiarity clause was included in the TEU. See Dinan, 1999. 
18 Interestingly, the desired role of the EU in people’s daily life in five years in Greece and Portugal 
scores  higher  than  the  EU  average  while  is  highest  in  Italy  and  more  or  less  average  in  Spain 
(Eurobarometer 56, Fig. 3.10b). Portugal, Italy and Greece are also the three EU countries where 
people are not satisfied with national democracy (Eurobarometer 56, Fig. 2.3). Italy, Greece and 
Spain, but not Portugal, also score above the average (at the top of the scale) regarding both the 
average level of support for EU decision-making (for 26 policy areas) and the number of policy areas 
where EU decision-making is more popular than national decision-making (Eurobarometer 56, 4.1). 
Portugal, Italy and Greece are also the countries where people tend to trust the EU more than the UN 






The process of European integration is a good example of how different 
challenges  posed  by  an  evolving  (“ever  closer”)  political  co-operation  may 
contribute to achieve a model of sustainable development that is compatible with the 
other objectives enshrined in the treaties.
19 The concept of sustainability implies that 
development is bound by some limits that, if surpassed, may cause its reversal. One 
can also argue that a development process may be reversed if based upon non-
democratic (and/or unaccountable) institutions. 
Evolving political co-operation has been increasingly subject to a multi-level 
political negotiation process in the EU. That process comprises, among others, co-
decision and all ensuing EU directives and legislation in general, the discussion and 
approval of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (an increasingly important tool 
of  soft  policy  coordination  in  EMU,  supporting  a  more  deliberative  way  of 
governance),  the  new  open  method  of  coordination  (OMC),  the  new  European 
Council Spring meetings, all sorts of European and national recommendations and 
parliament  resolutions,  the  adoption  of  summit  agendas  and  conclusions  and  of 
European  strategies  and  white  papers  and,  quite  importantly,  the  domestic  and 
European debate that takes place. 
More  recently  (since  the  Amsterdam  Treaty),  even  intergovernmental 
conferences (IGCs), convened to revise the treaties, are increasingly characterised by 
multi-level  political  negotiations.  In  fact,  these  intergovernmental  conferences 
include representatives of the European Parliament that is regularly briefed by the 
negotiators and can give its views on the issues under discussion. Moreover, the 
European Parliament’s views on the IGCs are increasingly important in shaping the 
European  public  opinion  on  these  matters  and  therefore  the  inter-governmental 
negotiation process. 
National parliaments, too, participate in that process. Not least, they retain 
the ultimate power of ratifying the treaties. Moreover, they also participate in the 
process through regular hearings with national (and other) IGC negotiators, through 
bilateral and multilateral meetings with the European Parliament’s Constitutional 
Committee  and  through  internal  and  open  discussions  (increasingly  with 
representatives of the Civil Society) and resolutions. The European Convention was 
the  maximum  exponent  of  the  (multi-level)  involvement/participation  of  many 
parties  in  such  a  process.  It  is  through  such  a  process  that  those  EU  policy 
constraints transform into European and national political objectives. 
  Such  a  multi-level  political  negotiation  process  in  the  EU  allows  for  a 
continuous discussion of processes and outcomes. That permanent discussion in turn 
permits increased transparency of and participation in the entire process of European 
                                                                                                                     
Luxembourg, come first (Eurobarometer 57, 4). 
19 The objective of sustainable development was enshrined in the Treaty on European Union, Article 
2, by the Amsterdam Treaty.  
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integration.  Moreover,  the  multi-level  political  negotiation  process  has  also 
repeatedly allowed for the creation of a national and European consensus for reform 
at the EU level. 
Furthermore,  the  European  Union  is  currently  in  a  process  of  transition 
towards a wider political union in Europe together with an increasingly important 
role of representative institutions. In such a situation, European institution-building, 
with more efficient and transparent bodies and even transnational political parties 
may be a way of reinforcing the democratic quality of the European integration 
process  (and  its  reach),  namely  the  link  between  participation  and  “responsible 
representation” of the voters and the guarantee that the existing social structures 
remain open and accessible to pressures from below. 
In most EU countries European integration challenges such as Economic and 
Monetary Union have worked not only as mechanisms for economic stabilisation 
but also, and perhaps more importantly, as pre-requisites for structural reform and 
long-term development.  
The responses to European integration challenges provide good examples of 
evolving  governance  in  the  EU  because  they  go  together  with  the  more  clearly 
perceived need for democratic control of its new institutions. In addition, they also 
allow  for  an  increased  participation  of  representative  institutions  and  the  civil 
society in the discussions that take place before the approval of treaty changes and 
their ratification about the goals of the envisaged reforms, i.e. on the envisaged type 
of model of society. 
Despite the fact that Europe does neither have (yet) a constitution nor a 
government  and  that  it  suffers  the  impact  of  globalisation  on  national  political 
systems  (that  are  unable  to  deal  with  new  global  problems  without  sharing 
sovereignty),  one  may  argue  that  such  conditions  may  also  be  leading  to  an 
improvement of the democratic quality of EU governance. 
In fact, the European Union has been experiencing a permanent re-drafting 
of its treaties, necessary to accommodate important institutional changes (such as the 
Internal Market, EMU, Schengen and the communitarisation of other matters of 
justice and internal affairs) that involve an explicit transfer of national sovereignty to 
the Union level. At the time of each constitutional change the question of democracy 
is discussed both Europe-wide and at the level of each Member State, in some cases 
in conjunction with a referendum and, especially in traditionally more centralised 
states, it is also focused on that very transfer of sovereignty.
20 
A multi-level political negotiation process may render policy-making more 
efficient by allowing for a continuous confrontation of positions at various levels of 
government, making it possible and easier to converge to an acceptable (for all and 
at the various levels of government) common position. 
                                           
20 That transfer of sovereignty only does not involve its external affairs aspect because other sources 
of power (such as the United Nations, NATO or simply the United States) superior to that of the EU 
and its territory do exist and both European citizens and member states recognise that. Recent world 
events illustrate this point well.  
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It follows that national parliaments, the European Parliament and European 
citizens  in  general  may  have  all  become  more  aware  of  the  need  for  more 
democratic control of new European institutions but also of the need of regaining 
democratic  control  over  national governments and institutions that have become 
more unaccountable through the process of globalisation. 
Therefore, despite the inexistence of a European constitution to date and of a 
European  government,  EU  governance  seems  not  to  be  hindering  European 
democracy but rather extending it bringing in some new important features, such as 
new  forms  of  participation,  through  the  interaction  of  different  institutions  and 




The  process  of  globalisation  made  the  tension  between  increasing 
complexity and the growing felt need for democracy in modern societies more acute. 
In fact, with globalisation, concentrated decision-making and larger organisational 
structures are well beyond the reach of democratic influence of national social and 
political systems. Moreover, many of the various problems that modern societies 
face cannot be dealt with successfully by national political systems – let us think of 
monetary and financial instability and global warming, just to mention two problems 
related to EMU and environmental policy. 
On the other hand, governments of different countries by getting together 
can only partly deal with that type of transnational problems, incurring in additional 
costs.  This  is  because  at  the  intergovernmental  level  the  process  of  reaching 
decisions is obviously more complicated: there are thus (very concrete) additional 
costs in terms of efficiency (concerning all the difficulties in reaching agreement 
among governments, to get then the approval of their respective parliaments, etc.) 
and citizens may feel even more acutely the need for more democracy, given the 
lack of transparency and/or the insufficient participation in that type of decisions.
21 
In fact, one can argue that the inter-governmental level alone, while necessary for 
carrying  on  the  European  integration  process  both  in  terms  of  processes  and 
outcomes,  is  neither  an  efficient  nor  a  transparent  or  a  participatory  way  of 
governance in the European Union. 
In  the  European  Union,  where  regional,  national,  inter-governmental  and 
federal  structures  overlap,  the  tension  between  increasing  complexity  and  the 
growing felt need for democracy in modern societies is thus even more evident than 
at the national level. In the EU there is an on-going evolution in terms of sharing 
sovereignty that should raise efficiency. Stable forms of political cooperation among 
                                           
21 For Beate Kohler-Koch (1999) for instance, majority voting, although increasing the effectiveness 
of decisions in the EU at the intergovernmental level, infringes the sovereign right of the Member 
States to ultimately decide what is and what is not acceptable to their national constituencies. Note 
that this presupposes, however, that the state still had GHIDFWR sovereignty in the first place. By 
pooling sovereignty in the EU some Member States might at least influence some decisions that they 
could not affect before.  
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the EU Member States are hence (quite an important) part of the solution as a way of 
improving  efficiency  (and  therefore  output  legitimisation)  but  also  part  of  the 
problem in terms of transparency and accountability as well as participation and 
deliberative processes (input legitimisation). Given that in the EU responsibility is 
much more diffuse than in national systems, it becomes even more difficult to bring 
the  various  institutions  that  formulate  policies  and/or  take  decisions  at  different 
levels into account.  
The question then is how to address the identified democratic deficit in terms 
of democratic accountability and transparency (and participatory and deliberative 
processes one might add) in the EU. In this paper the European Parliament is chosen 
to illustrate the point that it is the European institution that comes closest to fulfilling 
the functions of responsible representation and of principal for different other EU-
supranational bodies. 
In fact, the European Parliament is the representative institution at the EU 
level, directly chosen by the people. Thus, one can argue that not only in the case of 
EU-supranational bodies’ decisions but also in the case of qualified majority voting 
(QMV) where national governments may be outvoted in the Council, and therefore 
cannot be held accountable to national parliaments, the European Parliament can be 
seen  as  an  alternative  (to  a  certain  extent,  and  under  a  particular  perspective, 
complementary to national parliaments) for democratic accountability.
22 
By its very nature
23, the EP is also relatively open and accessible to pressures 
from below (and to lobbying, one might add), allowing for instance for citizens’ 
petitions  and  questioning;  it  also  somehow  facilitates  the  development  of  other 
emerging social structures, such as European parties or party families, independent 
from the national states, the Commission and the European Council.  
Moreover, the European Parliament, again as a representative institution, has 
a unique role in an overlapping political structure such as the European Union: it 
interacts more and more with the various national parliaments
24, bridging the gap 
between national and European representation; it is recognisably more open and 
accessible than any other European institution to pressures from below, allowing for 
an  increased  participation  of  European  citizens  in  the  Community’s  life;  and  it 
                                           
22 According to opinion polls (see Eurobarometer, 56 and 57), in the EU the European Parliament is 
the institution, among the main EU institutions and agencies, which people tend to trust most on 
average;  exceptions  are  Germany,  Denmark,  Finland,  Sweden,  Austria,  the  Netherlands  and 
Luxembourg where the Court of Justice and/or the ECB tend to score higher.  The EP is also the best 
known EU institution (Eurobarometer 56, fig. 7.10) and it is perceived to play the most important role 
in the life of the EU (Eurobarometer 56, fig. 3.6). 
23 Different MEPs and Staff tend to listen and receive all kind of different experts and organised and 
non-organised interests as a way of negotiating and advancing their own proposals and reports. They 
are  also  quite  open  (to  citizens,  the  media,  researchers,  etc.) regarding their political and policy 
options. 
24 The European Parliament holds regular meetings with members of the relevant national parliamenty 
committees on a wide range of issues: EMU and hearings of the ECB’s President, the BEPG, the 
IGCs,  EU  enlargement,  etc.,  not  to  mention  the  COSAC  -  Conference  of  European  Affairs 
Committees of the EU (and applicant countries) National Parliaments and the European Parliament - 
and the European Convention.  
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provides  more  transparency  to  the  process  of  decision-making  in  the  EU,  thus 
allowing  for  some  accountability  of  other  European  institutions,  such  as  the 
European Commission and the European Central Bank (see again Torres, 2003).  
  In the case of environmental policies, the European Parliament may have a 
leading role in adopting new common policies that internalise at the European level 
some  important  external  effects  such  as  pollution  regardless  of  differentiated 
national  resistances.  At  the  same  time,  those  pressures  from  above  (new  EU 
directives,  for  example)  may  also  reflect  pressures  from  below  (for  instance 
environmental groups of activists, non-governmental organisations and European 
citizens  in  general  that  may  include  especially  motivated  individual  national 
politicians and parliamentarians with special political clout) because of the European 
Parliament’s participation in the process of policy-making, for instance through the 
co-decision  process,  and  degree  of  openness  and  accessibility,  and  the views of 
national parliaments.  
  The  European  Parliament  may  then  well  increase  the  efficiency  of 
governance  at  the  European  level  by  smoothing  out  various  resistances  to  the 
acceptance of some common policies. But it increases efficiency as a consequence 
of  more  transparency  and  participation  and  not  at  the  cost  of  driving  political 
decision-making further away from citizens. 
  This role for the European Parliament has been somehow neglected in the 
literature. Most authors dealing with the legitimacy problem, the democratic deficit 
and the effectiveness problem of the European Union, defend that it would have to 
opt to be either a federal political union, with one government and one parliament, 
or a confederation of sovereign states, without majority-voting. Some authors, such 
as Beate Kohler-Koch (1999, p. 17), argue that the European Parliament has “an 
inferior representative quality”.
25 
It  is  possible  to  argue,  however,  that  the  representative  quality  (of  the 
European  population)  of  the  European  Parliament  is  also  evolving.  It  has  been 
assigned new roles in the Treaty Establishing the European Communities by the 
Maastricht  and  Amsterdam  treaties  and  this  fact  is  certainly  perceived  by  the 
European public opinion or the different Member States’ public opinions, as shown 
by  the  above  referred  polls.
26  That  fact  was  certainly  perceived  by  all  national 




                                           
25 This “inferior representative quality” of the European Parliament is in general attributed on the 
basis of the “inferior quality” of European elections (disputed not on European but on domestic 
political grounds and with very low turnouts and different national voting rules and party lists) and of 
the lack of clear political and ideological cleavages (MEPs remain rather technocratic). 
26 Regarding knowledge about the EP, how it is perceived to play the most important role in EU life 




  Since  the  ratification  of  the  Amsterdam  Treaty  it  became  even  more 
interesting for national parliaments to propose resolutions (namely at the initiative of 
their European Affairs Committees) with respect to the position of their respective 
governments in the Council for a number of directives, entering in this way the 
process of shaping different EU policies. This is possible because the Amsterdam 
Treaty has further extended the scope of the co-decision procedure, namely with 
respect  to  environmental  policies  (Article  175  of  the  Treaty  Establishing  the 
European Community).
27 
  The co-decision procedure was extended to most of what that was covered 
before  by  the  so-called  cooperation  procedure  and  indeed  to  most  areas  of 
legislation, unless otherwise specified as exempted or falling under one of the other 
procedures (see Helen Wallace, 2000, p. 22). 
  In fact, the co-decision procedure developed and extended the cooperation 
procedure created by the Single European Act to speed up the process of decision-
making with a view to the completion and well-functioning of the Single European 
Market (SEM), allowing for the European Parliament to step in (out of legitimacy 
considerations and also considerable pressure from the EP) in the case of qualified 
majority voting in the Council (for efficiency reasons). 
  In order not to increase efficiency at the expense of democracy (in the case 
that a national government was outvoted in the Council by QMV), the European 
Parliament was granted in the cooperation procedure (SEA) the power to propose 
amendments on legislation, albeit concerning a very limited number of Community 
areas.  In  the  case  of  qualified  majority  voting  there  would  thus  be  a  kind  of 
complementary  accountability  to  national  parliaments  and  to  the  European 
Parliament. 
  The Treaty of Maastricht created the co-decision procedure (Article 189b), 
giving the EP the power of veto over a legislative proposal.
 28 This power was then 
extended from 15 Maastricht Treaty articles to 37 Amsterdam Treaty articles (see 
Article 251 of the consolidated Treaty establishing the European Community). In 
fact, with the exception of EMU, external trade issues, fiscal harmonisation, the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), most 
European legislation is subject to the new co-decision procedure.
  
  With this new version of the co-decision procedure, one can argue that the 
European Parliament has substantially increased its legislative powers.
29 Moreover, 
                                           
27 Article 95 of the TEC has also been changed by the Amsterdam Treaty, allowing for exceptional 
measures based on environmental considerations that may not be in accordance with Internal Market 
rules. The European Commission has then a six-month time limit to review such measures. 
28 Note also that the protocol to the Amsterdam Treaty requires the European Council, the European 
Commission and the European Parliament to use co-decision as expeditiously as possible. 
29 Before the extension of its scope that issue was somewhat contentious, although the record of 
legislative  amendments  made  by  the  European  Parliament  and  accepted  by  the  European 
Commission and the Council of Ministers suggested otherwise. On the increase of power of the 
European Parliament with co-decision prior to its revision by the Amsterdam Treaty, see for instance 
Lisa Martin (1998) for a cautious approach (pointing to the need for further research) and George 
Tsebelis (1994 and 1995) and Garrett (1995) for a negative answer.  
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co-decision has certainly enhanced democratic accountability in the sense that the 
European  Commission,  a  non-elected  body,  had  to  share  its  exclusive  rights 
concerning draft legislation (a less contentious issue, even before the ratification of 
the Amsterdam Treaty – see Martin, 1998) with the European Parliament.  
  As a matter of fact, the European Parliament has had a strong influence on 
the  adoption  of  environmental  legislation  at  the  European  level.
30  Its  role  is 
particularly relevant in the field of environmental policy because it has managed to 
force the approval of more stringent rules than the ones initially proposed by the 
European Commission and the ones desired by the European Council and/or the 
European Union Council of Ministers. The co-decision procedure has been decisive 
in  that  respect.  In  the  already  mentioned  auto-oil  programme  for  instance,  the 
conciliation procedure triggered by the co-decision procedure led to more rigorous 
regulations  than  had  been  originally agreed by the EU Council (see Young and 
Wallace, 2000). 
  The co-decision procedure has also undoubtedly increased the possibility of 
a wider participation in the European legislative process, namely by providing a new 
channel of participation for the national parliaments.
 31
  Until recently, some EU countries, in particular the Cohesion countries but 
not  only,  tended  to  ask  for  derogations  with  respect to European environmental 
directives that had an immediate economic impact. This was due to the level of 
economic development, wrong national perceptions and EU incentives, as pointed 
out in the previous section. 
  In the case of the auto-oil programme, the European Affairs Committee of 
the  Portuguese  Parliament  adopted  a  resolution  project  considering  that  the 
derogation  that  was  expected  (already  during  the  co-decision  procedure)  to  be 
granted by the EU (and also accepted by the European Parliament, whose already 
mentioned more stringent and “greener” approach to the programme was favoured 
by the Portuguese parliamentary committee during the co-decision procedure) to 
Southern  countries,  namely  Greece,  Italy,  Spain  and  Portugal,  “could  have  had 
potentially  very  negative  consequences  for  Portugal,  namely  with  respect  to  the 
negotiation of Agenda 2000”. This meant playing the “European card”: the need not 
to be perceived as a laggard in the European integration process, especially during 
an  important  negotiation  of  financial  resources.  The  resolution  project  had  an 
                                           
30  See  Alberta  Sbragia  (2000),  for  an  account  of  its  increased  importance,  namely  through  the 
increasingly powerful and aggressively-led European Parliamentary Committee on the Environment, 
Public Health and Consumer Protection. For Farrell and Héritier (2002), the European Parliament has 
been successful in advancing its interests over time, increasing its role in the European legislative 
process,  precisely  through  the  strategic  use  of  the  relationship  between  formal  and  informal 
institutions. I stress here, in this regard, the interaction between the European Parliament and national 
parliaments. 
31 The Amsterdam Treaty included a protocol on the role of national parliaments, giving the COSAC 
(&RQIpUHQFHGHV2UJDQHV6SpFLDOLVpHVDX[$IIDLUHV&RPPXQDXWDLUHV), the bi-annual meetings of the 
Conference  of  European  Affairs  Committees  of  the  EU  (and  applicant  countries)  National 
Parliaments and the European Parliament, the right to send comments on EU legislative proposals to 
the European Commission, the European Council and the European Parliament.  
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important role in obliging the domestic oil sector to comply with the abolition of 
leaded gasoline six months ahead of schedule instead of making use of a derogation 
of two to three years. Following that decision the Portuguese Government could also 
adopt  a  more  open  attitude  in  the  European  Council  in  2000,  shortening  the 
derogation for the adoption of the outstanding part of the programme in Portugal.
32 
  The auto-oil example is interesting because it indicates that the interaction 
between EU national parliaments and the European Parliament may make it possible 
to overcome both specific interests and strong lobbying or the more accommodating 
(sometimes short-sighted) positions of the Council and/or of the Commission.
33 It 
may  also  suggest  that  it  is  possible  to  overcome  sometimes  unjustified  fears  of 
national governments to appear to be too radical (“fundamentalist”) and/or of being 
accused of not adequately defending the “national” interest (that is, in the case of the 
auto-oil programme, of not defending well the “national” oil sectors). 
  Thanks  to  the  co-decision  procedure  and  to  its  discussion  in  national 
parliaments, discussions and deliberations of the European Parliament as well as 
European  environmental  directives  are  now  followed  up  and  in  some  cases 
strengthened  before  being  torpedoed  by  some  derogation  and/or  by  special 
conditions.
34 What happened in Portugal with the auto-oil programme may happen 
in any other EU Member State with European directives such as the defence of 
special protected areas and/or species. The European directives on birds and habitats 
collide  in  many  instances  with  the  accommodation  of  private  interests;  the 
Commission and the ECJ (pressures from “above”) may then be allies of public 
interest (pressures from “below” or bottom-up pressures).
  
A new attitude with respect to the importance of internalising environmental 
externalities  has  then  a  much  better  chance  to  thrive  if  different  national  actors 
(parliamentarians, politicians in general, NGOs and citizens movements) succeed in 
obtaining a firm backing from the European institutions. As already stated above, a 
clearer  conditionality  of  structural  funds  concerning  the  compliance  with 
environmental policies would also be of great help in ensuring a wider participation 
of  the  affected  population  in  recipient  countries.  That  is  only  possible  with  an 
enhanced  role  of  representative  (parliamentarian)  institutions  in  the  process  of 
policy-making in the European Union. 
                                           
32 It appears, however, that the Portuguese national oil sector delayed as much as possible the full 
implementation of the directive as far as diesel was concerned. 
33 Noury and Roland (2002) found out that in votes held under the co-decision procedure, where the 
EP is most powerful, MEPs participate more and are more party-cohesive. These findings reinforce 
the idea, already expressed above with respect to EMU and to the Stability and Growth Pact, that the 
European Parliament cannot be so directly influenced by the electoral or other short-term concerns of 
one or two governments in the EU. This in turn reinforces the importance of the European Parliament 
as a representative institution for the democratic quality of the European governance and integration 
processes and their outcomes. 
34 Examples of this co-operation have been discussed at COSAC meetings. The auto-oil resolution 
project of the Portuguese parliament was also stressed by the President of the Belgian Parliament as 
exemplary at a Speakers’ conference in Vienna in 1998 and discussed, as an example of an enhanced 
role for national parliaments, at the COSAC of Vienna.  
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The joint decision-making mode of governance has contributed to enhanced EU 
policy effectiveness especially in regard to European environmental legislation. The 
European  Parliament,  as  a  co-legislator  with  veto  power  in  the  co-decision 
procedure, has been a crucial organisational actor. It has, to start with, obliged the 
European Commission, a non-elected body, to share with it its rights concerning 
draft legislation. In addition, its interactions – “informal institutions” – with other 
actors,  such  as national parliaments, the Council of Ministers and the European 
Commission, have been particular relevant in the building-up of more appropriate 
and  legitimate  incentives  for  the  correct  implementation  of  common  policies, 
internalising many environmental externalities. Such interactions have also allowed 
for a more active role of EU national parliaments in the EU legislative process, 
increasing their leverage vis-à-vis their respective governments as far as European 
legislation is concerned. They may help develop in the future a democratic form of 
conditionality for the more efficient use of EU and national resources in fostering 
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